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The Value of Control and the Costs of Illiquidity
Rui Albuquerque and Enrique Schroth
Forthcoming, Journal of Finance
ABSTRACT
We develop a search model of block trades that values the illiquidity of control-
ling stakes. The model considers several dimensions of illiquidity. First, following a
liquidity shock, the controlling blockholder is forced to sell, possibly to a less e¢ cient
acquirer. Second, this sale may occur at a re sale price. Third, absent a liquidity
shock, a trade occurs only if a potential buyer arrives. Using a structural estima-
tion approach and U.S. data on trades of controlling blocks of public corporations,
we estimate the value of control, the blockholdersmarketability discount and the
dispersed shareholdersilliquidity-spillover discount.
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High ownership concentration is a predominant phenomenon in the corporate world. In many
countries, including the United States, evidence suggests that high ownership concentration is
pervasive in public corporations.1 By denition, ownership concentration is also an integral
part of privately held corporations.2 In this paper, we study the value of controlling blocks
of shares in public corporations, contributing to the understanding of the costs and benets
of concentrated ownership. An inherent di¢ culty in valuing controlling blocks of shares is the
illiquidity of the market. Theoretically, illiquidity in the market for controlling blocks is a cost
that a¤ects the block value, possibly in a nonlinear way. Empirically, illiquidity reduces the
number of observations available to the econometrician and constrains the empirical strategy
of estimating the block value. We provide a model of the trading and pricing of controlling
blocks in an illiquid market with search frictions. We argue that block-trading events convey
information that identies the model parameters and allows the estimation of the value of
control.
The models main premise is that a controlling blockholder of a public corporation a¤ects
the value of the rms assets (Holderness and Sheehan (1988); Barclay and Holderness (1989);
and more recently Pérez-González (2004)). Therefore, given the choice, the controlling block-
holder will only sell to a bidder who can increase asset value. In addition, we assume that the
controlling blockholder is forced to sell if hit by a liquidity shock, in which case he may sell to
a party that creates less asset value and be paid a re sale price. The potential absence of a
bidder at any given time further increases the illiquidity of the block. These frictions give rise
to a marketability discount on the value of the block. Additionally, the possibility that the new
blockholder may decrease asset value introduces a discount on the dispersed shares traded in
the stock market. We name this novel e¤ect the illiquidity-spillover discount.
The estimation of the marketability and the illiquidity-spillover discounts is notoriously dif-
cult because they require a counter-factual analysis: what should the price be absent search
frictions? The structural estimation adopted in the paper uses the models pricing equations
to evaluate this counter-factual price. To meet that goal, the structural estimation must suc-
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cessfully identify the parameters of these pricing equations. In particular, since the pricing will
di¤er depending on whether or not the trade was caused by liquidity shocks, the model must
identify ex post the reasons for trading. These reasons are unobservable to the econometrician.
One contribution of this paper is to show that it is possible to identify the models parame-
ters by using the valuations of two di¤erent types of shareholders during a block trade: the
blockholdersvaluation implicit in the negotiated block price and the dispersed shareholders
valuation revealed in the exchange share price.
In the model, a liquidity shock is the realization of a random variable with a Bernoulli
distribution that forces blockholder turnover. Following a liquidity shock, the block is sold at a
re sale price equal to a fraction of the buyers valuation. In contrast, the dispersed shareholders
only care about the discounted value of future cash ows under the new blockholder and not
the re sale price. This price di¤erence allows us to identify re sale discounts.
In the absence of a liquidity shock, the block changes hands only if a potential new block-
holder arrives and can generate more cash ow. In this case, block and share prices di¤er partly
because liquidity shocks penalize blockholders more than dispersed shareholders, who are un-
a¤ected by the lower expected re sale price in a future sale. In short, our model is able to
fully exploit the data by identifying liquidity shock probabilities not only out of the frequency
of trades with negative price reactions, but also the block vs. share price di¤erences that exist
whether or not liquidity shocks have occurred.
We estimate an average probability of getting a liquidity shock within one year of 20%, and,
conditional on a liquidity shock, an average re sale discount of 8% of the block value.3 The
estimated probability of meeting a potential buyer within one year is 43%. We nd that the
marketability discount, which is a non-linear function of these three estimates, is on average
13% of the block value, with a standard deviation of 22%. The spillover e¤ect of the blocks
illiquidity on the dispersed shares is on average 2.1% of the share price.4
A selection bias in our estimates may arise if not all liquidity shocks lead to a re sale. That
is, blockholders may have a reservation value that is determined by the actions taken to avoid
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a re sale, for example, using the block as collateral for a loan. We argue that this selection
bias leads to downward-biased estimates of the probability of a liquidity shock. In addition, our
reduced form approach to re sale prices may lead to upward-biased estimates of the re sale
price. That is, what we call a re sale price is likely to be the maximum payout among many
alternative ways of reacting to the liquidity shock, which include, for example, the arrival of a
private equity rm supplying liquidity. Because the marketability and the illiquidity-spillover
discounts are decreasing in the re sale price and increasing in the probability of a liquidity
shock, these biases lead to the underestimation of the discounts. Our approach, therefore, gives
a conservative estimate of the discounts we study.
We allow the probability of a liquidity shock and the re sale price to vary across deals
as a function of economy-wide and deal-specic determinants of liquidity in order to match
the observed variation in the block and exchange share prices. Economy-wide determinants
of liquidity appear to capture unobserved variation in the probability of a liquidity shock,
whereas rm and industry characteristics appear to capture unobserved variation in re sale
values. We nd that the probability of a liquidity shock is increasing in the Fontaine and Garcia
(2012) measure of aggregate funding illiquidity, and decreasing in GDP growth and the stock
market return. However, the probability of a liquidity shock is high when GDP growth and
market returns are high and the yield curve is steep. Our interpretation is that macroeconomic
expansions increase block holder liquidity via their balance sheet e¤ects but may also trigger a
preference for cash if they bring good investment opportunities when outside funding is costly.
The blocks re sale value decreases with the degree of asset specicity of the target rms
industry and with the target rms leverage relative to that of its industry. The evidence
that the state of the aggregate economy determines rm-specic liquidity complements the
work of Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2000) and Bao, Pan, and Wang (2011), who nd
commonalities in asset-specic liquidity measures.
We discuss the robustness of our results to other possible motives for trading. Trading could
arise if the block buyer derives more private benets than the seller. If the buyer is also unable
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to increase share value, the resulting drop in the dispersed shareholdersvaluation could be
misinterpreted as a the consequence of a liquidity trade. We show that the use of data on the
blockholdersvaluation, together with data on the dispersed shareholdersvaluation, allows us
to distinguish these two types of trades. Intuitively, liquidity trades are bad events for the block
sellers whereas private benets trades are good events. Therefore, the two trading reasons have
opposite e¤ects on the blockholders valuation.
The literature has considered alternative ways of measuring the value of control. One ap-
proach is to look at the voting premium, measured directly as the price di¤erence of shares with
di¤erent voting rights (e.g., Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2009)), or indirectly as deviations from
put-call parity (Kalay, Karakas, and Pant (2012)) and equity-loan values (Christo¤ersen et al.
(2007)). By studying per share prices, these approaches measure the marginal value of control.
Because in our data we have the total price of a block, we are able to comment on the total
value of control. Moreover, our structural approach allows us to isolate the cost of illiquidity
from the total e¤ect of control, which also includes the increase in security benets.
The paper that is closest to ours is Albuquerque and Schroth (2010). They estimate private
benets of control that result from diverting cash ow, whereas we are the rst to estimate the
costs of illiquidity embedded in the value of control. Albuquerque and Schroth (2010) focus on
smaller controlling blocks as they expect that private benets of control are more likely to have
a rst order e¤ect on valuations and trading decisions in these blocks. Illiquidity has no role in
their model. In contrast, our main premise is the opposite: for larger blocks, illiquidity is more
likely to have a rst order e¤ect whereas incentive alignment between controlling and dispersed
shareholders should imply zero private benets of control derived from the rms cash ows.
The literature started by Barclay and Holderness (1989) also looks at the total value of control.
These papers do not consider the costs of illiquidity associated with large blocks.
There is a vast literature on the pricing of illiquid assets (see Amihud, Mendelson, and
Pedersen (2005) for a comprehensive survey). Longsta¤ (1995) measures the marketability
discount associated with stocks with trading restrictions. Our paper considers search frictions
4
as opposed to trading restrictions and allows the owner of the shares to have an inuence over
the cash ows of the rm. Du¢ e, Garleanu, and Pedersen (2005, 2007) present search models
of over-the-counter markets with atomistic investors. In these papers there is no controlling
shareholder that can a¤ect the value of assets and discounts result from a pure search cost. In
our paper, liquidity costs also arise from the possibility of having to sell the block at re sale
prices and to a less e¢ cient buyer.
Related theoretical work shows that concentrated ownership induces illiquidity in the rms
exchange traded shares (see Demsetz (1968), Holmstrom and Tirole (1993), and Bolton and von
Thadden (1998)).5 This literature focuses on the price implications of a reduced oat. Instead,
by studying block-trading events where the oat is unchanged, we are able to focus on the pricing
implications of liquidity shocks to large blockholders. Kahn and Winton (1998) and Maug
(1998) argue that, if blockholders obtain value-relevant information from their monitoring, then
the resulting adverse selection problem when blockholders trade their shares lowers liquidity
(see also Edmans and Manso (2011)). We believe that the size of the controlling blocks studied
in this paper and the fact that blocks are not partitioned suggest that this cause for illiquidity
is of second order in our exercise and should not a¤ect our results.
Vayanos and Wang (2007) and Weill (2008) study illiquidity spillovers in search models with
multiple securities. They nd that search frictions can lead to higher prices in more liquid
assets (i.e., with lower search times) despite the fact that the assets have identical cash ows.
Chordia, Sarkar, and Subrahmanyam (2011) nd evidence of liquidity spillovers across size
portfolios by inspecting lead-lag cross-correlation patterns. Aragon and Strahan (2009) use the
Lehman Brothers bankruptcy to show that stocks traded by hedge funds connected to Lehman
experienced greater declines in market liquidity. The illiquidity spillover studied in this paper
instead looks at how the liquidity shocks to the controlling blockholder spill over to the value
of the shares held by dispersed investors of the same rm.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I presents preliminary evidence on controlling block
trades, motivating some of our modeling assumptions and our identication strategy. Section
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II presents the search model that we use to price controlling blocks and dispersed shares.
Section III describes the empirical strategy. Section IV summarizes the data used and Section
V presents the main results. Section VI discusses additional tests and Section VII concludes.
I. Preliminary Evidence on Controlling Block Trades
In a block trade, the incumbent holder of a block of shares on a target rm sells the entire
block to a rival blockholder. Simultaneously, dispersed shareholders of the same target rm
react to the news of the trade leading to a change in the price of the exchange-traded shares.
This information is summarized respectively in the block premium (BP ) paid by the acquirer
of the block and in the cumulative abnormal (announcement) return (CAR) on the exchange-
traded shares.
Our data comprise 114 U.S. disclosed-value acquisitions of blocks of more than 35% but less
than 90% of the shares of a company between January 1, 1990, and December 31, 2010. These
data are described in detail in Section IV. We measure BP as the ratio of the unit block price
to the exchange-traded share price 21 trading days before the block trade announcement. We
measure CAR as the ratio of the exchange-traded share price 2 trading days after the block
trade announcement to the exchange-traded share price 21 trading days before the announce-
ment. This choice of event window follows Barclay and Holderness (1989) and others, and is
meant to capture the full e¤ect of market expectations about the unfolding block trade and the
corresponding e¤ect of the change of control on security benets.
Figure 1 shows the scatter plot of BP and CAR in our sample. There are several noteworthy
features. First, the average BP in our sample is 6:8% and the average CAR is 9:6%. Despite
these positive means, 47% of deals have negative BP and 42% of deals have negative CAR.
Second, BP and CAR are positively correlated, with a correlation coe¢ cient of 0:37. This
strong association captures the fact that most trades are concentrated in two regions of the
scatter plot, with 74% of the trades with positive CAR exhibiting a block premium and 75% of
the trades with a negative CAR exhibiting a block discount. Therefore, this evidence suggests
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that, for most majority-block trades, dispersed shareholders and blockholders either gain or
lose simultaneously.
<INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE>
How are these data informative of liquidity shock probabilities? Consider the subsample of
trades where dispersed shareholders respond negatively to the announcement (i.e., CAR < 0).
For these deals, a decline in the shared security benets may have been caused by either a
liquidity shock that forced the incumbent blockholder to sell, implying also losses to the block-
holder (i.e., BP < 0) or a gain in private benets at the expense of the dispersed shareholders,
so that BP > 0.
Based on this distinction, one approach to identify the probability of liquidity shocks would
be to treat all deals with CAR < 0 and BP < 0 as having been caused by such shocks and
then specify a reduced-form probabilistic regression model to explain the event that CAR < 0
and BP < 0. However, this approach introduces biases by neglecting the fact that deals with
CAR > 0 can also be informative of liquidity shocks. First, the incumbent blockholder may have
been hit by a liquidity shock but found a white knight that provided liquidity while increasing
shared security benets. Second, forward-looking block and share prices must incorporate the
possibility of liquidity shocks in the future, even for deals that were not caused by liquidity
shocks. Indeed, 30% of our sample contains deals where blockholders gain more than share-
holders (BP > CAR > 0). While these deals were most likely caused by an increase in security
benets, the transaction prices embedded in BP and CAR are likely to also reect information
about liquidity shocks.
We extract two conclusions from this discussion. First, because block trades by and large
imply either simultaneous gains or losses to blockholders and dispersed shareholders, the main
reasons for trading in our data must be increase in security benets or sales forced by liquidity
shocks. Second, a successful approach to identify the probability of liquidity shocks must
recognize the di¤erent pricing scenarios that generate block premia or discounts, and positive
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or negative CAR. Moreover, due to their forward-looking nature, the prices in di¤erent scenarios
will incorporate information about the same parameters. Essentially, any deal in the data can
potentially be informative of liquidity shocks if structurally modeled.
The di¢ culties in identifying illiquidity-driven trades carry over to estimating the value of
control. Because the block premium in deals with positive CAR incorporates both shared se-
curity benets and illiquidity costs, estimation of illiquidity costs requires a way to disentangle
these two opposing e¤ects. The model developed in this paper proposes an economic mech-
anism whereby illiquidity costs have di¤erent e¤ects on blockholder valuations and dispersed
shareholder valuations. The structural estimation infers these illiquidity costs by matching the
data on BP and CAR to the models predictions of these prices.
II. A search theory of block trades
This section presents an estimable model of the valuation of a controlling block that includes
a proportion  < 1 of the shares of a rm, and the valuation of the 1  remaining shares held
by dispersed shareholders. Time is discrete and investors have discount factor  < 1.
A. Blockholders value
The current block owner is called the incumbent and is denoted by I. The rms cash ow
is a discrete random variable that takes values on a grid f1; :::; Ng :Without loss of generality,
we assume that m > l for any m > l. Let Il denote the rms cash ow in state l when
I is in control. It evolves stochastically according to the conditional probability distribution
Pr [0 = mj = l] = qlm with qlm > 0 and
PN
m=1 qlm = 1 for every l = 1:::; N , where the prime
denotes next period values. We assume that the transition matrix induced by the conditional
probabilities qlm is monotone.
Denote by v
 
Il

the incumbents per share value of the block at Il . This value includes the
shared security benets and illiquidity costs to the blockholder. The blockholder also obtains
private benets. We assume that these private benets do not come from the rms cash ows,
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but rather from social prestige and network building in the case of an individual blockholder
or from valuable synergies in the case of a corporate blockholder. We assume per share private
benets are constant across incumbent and rival and equal to B.
At the beginning of every period, I may face a liquidity shock with probability . If a
liquidity shock occurs, then I is forced to sell at a re sale price to a rival blockholder denoted
by R. The rms cash ow under the rival is denoted by Rm and is drawn from the same
transition matrix induced by qlm given the current state l. We do not model how the block
trades following a liquidity shock. Instead, we specify the re sale price in reduced form as
v
 
Rm

. The parameter  summarizes the owners liquidity and the parameter  summarizes
the assets liquidity. Therefore, the ex ante block price upon a liquidity shock is
Lvl = 
NX
k=1
qlkv (k) : (1)
If a liquidity shock does not occur, the incumbent is matched with a potential buyer with
probability . The parameter  is a measure of market thinness. We assume trading is the result
of Nash bargaining, where the sellers relative bargaining power is  2 [0; 1]. If bargaining is
successful, R pays the price s
 
Ik; 
R
m

and gets v
 
Rm

plus the private benets.
The value of the block to the incumbent, v, is the sum of the current cash ow, Il , the
continuation value in the absence of a liquidity shock, ~v, and the liquidation value, Lvl , that is,
v
 
Il

= Il + 
"
(1  )
NX
k=1
qlk~vl
 
Ik

+ Lvl
#
: (2)
The continuation value absent a liquidity shock plus private benets equal
~vl
 
Ik

+B = 
NX
m=1
qlmmax

s
 
Ik; 
R
m

; v
 
Ik

+B

+ (1  ) v  Ik+B : (3)
The incumbent has an option to sell the block for s
 
Ik; 
R
m

to a higher valued blockholder.
Under Nash bargaining, s
 
Ik; 
R
m

solves
max
s

s   v  Ik+B  v  Rm+B  s1  :
When a there are gains from trade
 
v
 
Ik

< v
 
Rm

, the solution is
s
 
Ik; 
R
m

= B + v
 
Ik

+  

v
 
Rm
  v  Ik : (4)
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Otherwise, no trade occurs and I remains the blockholder with valuation v
 
Ik

+B. From (4),
the block price must compensate I for the value attained by not selling plus Is fraction of the
added surplus that results from R taking over.
The next proposition characterizes the function v (). The proof is provided in the appendix.
Proposition 1 The value function v exists, is unique, and is strictly increasing in .
The property that v is strictly increasing implies that it is optimal to sell the block if and
only if Ik < 
R
m. Therefore, we can simplify ~v as
~vl
 
Ik

= v
 
Ik

+  
X
m>k
qlm

v
 
Rm
  v  Ik : (5)
The last term on the right hand side of equation (5) is the value of the option to sell. The
fraction  of the option to sell accrues to I but can only be captured if a rival appears, which
occurs with probability . Note that it is worth selling to an incrementally better rival because
all future increases in value that result from a sale by the rival are already properly valued in
v and there are no xed costs of selling.
The models property that the block is sold if and only if Ik < 
R
m (rather than if and only if
v
 
Ik

< v
 
Rm

) is extremely useful. As we show in Appendix B, this property implies that we
can solve the xed point problem dening v (equations (2) and (5)) via a perfectly identied
system of linear equations that only requires inverting a matrix. Proposition 1 guarantees
that this matrix inverse exists. This property follows from the assumption that R and I are
heterogeneous only with respect to the cash ow they generate. Any two blockholders generating
the same cash ow have equal security benets, v () : Without this property, we would have
to solve the value function xed point problem simultaneously with the decision rule that
v
 
Ik

< v
 
Rm

(see Afonso and Lagos (2012) for a similar result).
B. Dispersed shareholdersvalue
The model assumes complete information by all investors. Therefore, dispersed shareholders
know the cash ow under current and rival management and trade the stock in a competitive
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stock market at the share price p such that
p
 
Il

= Il + 
"
(1  )
NX
k=1
qlk ~pl
 
Ik

+ Lpl
#
: (6)
Dispersed shareholders know that with probability 1    there is no liquidity shock and the
block is sold if and only if a rival is present and generates higher cash ows. The share price
absent a liquidity shock, ~p; is given by
~pl
 
Ik

= p
 
Ik

+ 
NX
m=1
qlmmax

p
 
Rm
  p  Ik ; 0 : (7)
Dispersed shareholders also benet from Is option to sell. Further, we will show that p () is
increasing in , which implies that Is decision rule to sell is e¢ cient. This result is appealing
because it is consistent with the correlation between the block premium and announcement
return documented in Section I. The last component of the share price is the expected share
price if a liquidity shock occurs,
Lpl =
NX
k=1
qlkp (k) : (8)
Dispersed shareholders di¤er from blockholders in three ways. First, they do not receive
any private benets from holding the stock. Second, dispersed shareholders are able to extract
all the value from the option to sell because they act in a competitive market. Indeed, they do
not bargain over the gains from trade. Third, dispersed shareholders are not hit with liquidity
shocks and are not forced to sell at a re sale price. However, they lose if, upon a liquidity
shock, the incumbent sells to a rival that generates lower cash ows. These di¤erences are
critical for the model to identify the illiquidity cost parameters.
The next proposition characterizes the function p ().
Proposition 2 The value function p exists, is unique, and is strictly increasing in . Also,
p () > v () for any  whenever  > 0 and  < 1, or  > 0 and  < 1.
As in Bolton and von Thadden (1998), dispersed shareholders value security benets more
than the blockholder. This discrepancy arises because the model imposes search frictions to
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blockholders that have less impact on dispersed shareholders. Specically, when the probability
of a liquidity shock is strictly positive, re sale discounts a¤ect blockholders more than they do
dispersed shareholders if  < 1. Likewise, when  > 0, selling to a more e¢ cient rival benets
the dispersed shareholders more because  < 1. The model therefore relies on private benets to
explain why blockholders may value shares of the target rm more than dispersed shareholders.
C. The block premium and the price reaction to the trade
Conditional on a trade, the block price is v
 
Rm

if a liquidity shock occurs, and s
 
Ik; 
R
m

otherwise. The block premium is dened as the ratio of the per-share block price to the per-
share pre-trade price:
BP
 
Ik; 
R
m
 
8><>:
v(Rm)
p(Ik)
  1; if a liquidity shock occurs,
s(Ik;
R
m)
p(Ik)
  1; else.
(9)
The price reaction to the block trade announcement is dened by:
CAR
 
Ik; 
R
m
  p  Rm
p
 
Ik
   1: (10)
Note that CAR < 0 signals liquidity shocks: it only occurs if the block is traded after a
liquidity shock and the new block owner generates lower cash ow. However, the converse is
not true: CAR > 0 occurs following a liquidity shock if the randomly matched rival produces a
higher cash ow. The next section discusses how the probability of a liquidity shock is identied
despite this di¢ culty.
III. Empirical strategy
The unit of observation in our data is a block trade indexed by i. The dependent variables
are CARi and BPi. Our model allows us to construct theoretical counterparts to these for each
deal as a function of the parameters of interest: the owners liquidity shock probability, , the
assets liquidity parameter, , market thinness, , the blockholders private benets, B, and the
sellers bargaining power,  . This section starts by providing an intuitive description of how the
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model identies these parameters from the data. These parameters are constant in the model
for each trade and we will treat them as such in the empirical estimation. However, there is no
model-imposed restriction on how these parameters vary across trades. We then discuss how
we specify variation across trades for some of these parameters. Finally, the section describes
the estimation method.
A. Identication
We develop a novel identication strategy to estimate a search model that uses the di¤erences
in the valuation of blockholders, BP , and of dispersed shareholders, CAR, at the time of the
block trade. Traditional identication strategies in search models require either information on
the time between two trades of the same block or contemporaneous trades of di¤erent blocks
on the same stock (Feldhütter (2012)). Neither alternative is feasible to us.
A.1. Identication of 
The model denes three main regions in the (CAR;BP ) space that can be used to iden-
tify liquidity shocks. First, the model infers that trades exhibiting a negative price reaction
(CAR < 0) must have been caused by a liquidity shock.
Second, the model infers that a liquidity shock cannot have occurred if the trade resulted
in a block premium that surpassed the increase in dispersed shareholderss valuation, BP 
CAR > 0: To see this note that v
 
R
  v  R < p  R, for any R, so that any trade caused
by a liquidity shock must have
BP =
v
 
R

p (I)
  1 < p
 
R

p (I)
  1 = CAR:
Hence, deals in Figure 1 with BP  CAR > 0 are voluntary trades where shared benets
increased.
Third, for the remaining deals in the sample with CAR > 0 and CAR > BP , the model
assigns an ex-post probability that a liquidity shock occurred that is equal to
  Pr [0 > lj = l]
  Pr [0 > lj = l] + (1  )  : (11)
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The numerator describes the probability that a trade results from a liquidity shock to the
incumbent that nonetheless yields an increase in shared benets. The denominator describes
the probability that a trade occurs and there is an increase in shared benets.
Interestingly, the model allows us to extract information about  even for those deals that
it predicts were not caused by a liquidity shock, that is, in the region where BP  CAR > 0.
To see this, consider panel (a) of Figure 2, which plots the simulated mean valuation spread
BP   CAR conditional on BP  CAR > 0; against . The parameter values are close to the
actual estimates given below, but the plot has an identical shape for a wide range of values.
The valuation spread is decreasing in . Intuitively, this spread reects the fact that these
shocks penalize blockholders more than dispersed shareholders because blockholders have a
lower expected re sale price. Interestingly, the valuation spread is informative (i.e., steeper)
when liquidity shocks did not occur ex post (i.e., BP > CAR > 0) and were unlikely ex ante
(i.e., low ).
<INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE>
A.2. Identication of  and 
Estimation of  relies on the fact that re sale prices a¤ect only the blockholdersvalue, v,
but not the share price, p. Therefore, when a liquidity shock has occurred, the model primarily
assigns the variation in block prices that is not associated with variation in the price reaction
to variation in . In addition, it is possible to infer variation in  even in deals that the model
predicts that there was no liquidity shock. Panel (b) of Figure 2 indicates that the valuation
spread increases with  conditional on BP  CAR > 0. The intuition is that, in this region,
the block premium incorporates the likelihood of a future re sale and therefore is increasing
in , whereas the announcement return is una¤ected by .
Market thinness, , a¤ects directly the value of the option to sell to a high-valued rival. Like
; BP and CAR increase with . However, as depicted in panel (c) of Figure 2, BP   CAR
shows little sensitivity to whereas it shows great sensitivity to  and . The identication of
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 relies on the fact that, unlike , it cannot explain the occurrence of negative price reactions.
A.3. Identication of B and  
The size of private benets B has an important role in capturing variation in the data where
CAR > 0. The choice of B faces the following trade-o¤: too low and the estimation may fail
to match the average block premium in deals where BP  CAR > 0; too high and it may
misclassify trades with low BP and CAR > 0 as due to liquidity shocks. For this reason, we
add some exibility to the functional form of B, allowing private benets to vary across deals
but, to remain consistent with the model, not across blockholders in the same deal.
To identify the bargaining parameter,  , the model relies on the fact that  a¤ects the block
price but not CAR. While these facts are also true for the asset liquidity parameter, , there is
one important di¤erence between  and :  has a rst order e¤ect on the block price absent
a liquidity shock through the value of the option to sell, whereas  has a rst order e¤ect on
the block price in the presence of a liquidity shock.
B. Modeling liquidity
In our estimation, as well as in the model,  and  are constant for each deal but allowed to
vary across deals. We model the cross-sectional variation in  and  using parametric logistic
functions:
 (xi;) =
exp (x0i)
1 + exp (x0i)
; (12)
 (zi;) =
exp (z0i)
1 + exp (z0i)
: (13)
By construction, the logistic function guarantees that  and  are bounded between 0 and 1. In
these functions, xi and zi are vectors of exogenous determinants of liquidity shocks and re sale
prices, respectively, whereas  and  are vectors of xed sensitivities to be estimated. As we
describe in detail in Section IV, xi includes variables that describe the state of liquidity, such
as aggregate indices of funding costs and investment opportunities. The variables included
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in zi capture variation in the traded blocks re sale value, including proxies for industry
redeployability and asset specicity. Variation in xi and zi across deals allows us to estimate 
and  through the variation they produce on BP and CAR.
While  varies with xi and  varies with zi, the model and the estimation constrain  and
 to be constant over time for each deal i. This assumption is equivalent to assuming that
blockholders and dispersed shareholders display a myopic attitude towards changes in these
quantities. The ability of the model to reasonably t the data suggests that our assumption
may not be too restrictive and the reason may be that the variables we include in xi and zi are
quite persistent. Ideally, the model and estimation would allow for xi and zi to be state variables
in the investorsproblems and for investors to change their valuations as their forecasts of  and
 changed. We do not pursue this approach because it is highly computationally demanding,
but allowing for time variation in  and  is a goal for future research.
C. Estimation
C.1. Algorithm
For each deal, we estimate the conditional probabilities qlm using annual cash ow data at
the target rms 3-digit SIC level. We obtain an industry cash ow grid and its associated
Markov transition matrix from the discretization of the estimated AR(1) process of the log-
detrended cash ow time series. We construct a rm-level grid from the industry grid assuming
constant price to cash ow ratios. The use of industry data for the regressions guarantees, with
its longer time series, more precise estimates. More details can be found in Appendix C.
We set the discount factor  to 1=1:1. This choice of a 10% discount rate includes a risk-
free rate, a market premium and an additional premium for the lack of diversication. Lower
discount factors tend to generate higher variation in CAR because the changes in CAR approach
the changes in one-period cash ows when the future matters less. Section VI shows that this
additional variation in CAR comes at the cost of limiting the e¤ect of the liquidity frictions on
prices because these frictions impact prices through future cash ow variation.
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Private benets are identical across incumbent and rival for each deal, but as with the
liquidity parameters, we allow private benets to vary across deals. We specify Bi as
Bi = b0 + b1E (v (i)) + b2E (p (i)) (1  i) =i;
which allows for a higher utility from running a more valuable block, through E(v); and a
glowe¤ect, through E (p) (1  ), that the blockholder gets from running a rm with a large
capitalization of the dispersed shares. The parameters to estimate, b0; b1, and b2; are constant
across deals.
We estimate the models parameters,   = f ; ; b0; b1; b2;;g ; using the simulated method
of moments (SMM). This estimator minimizes the norm function,
J = [m (fBPi; CARigi; ) M]0 W  [m (fBPi; CARigi; ) M] ;
where m (fBPi; CARigi; ) is a vector of model-predicted moments of the joint distribution
of the two observed endogenous variables, the block premium and the price reaction to the
announcement, and M is the vector of the same moments in the sample. W is a matrix of
weights. The procedure to search for the SMM estimator is explained in Appendix C, including
the care we take in the choice of initial conditions.
C.2. Moment conditions
The number of parameters to estimate is equal to the number of parameters in  and 
plus 5. We identify these parameters through an over-identifying set of 3 (# () + # ()) + 7
moment conditions. First, m includes moments that condition on deals the model predicts
were caused by liquidity shocks, that is, where CAR < 0 and BP < 0. We include the rst
and second moments of BP and CAR: E(BP jCAR < 0; BP < 0), V ar(BP jCAR < 0; BP < 0),
V ar(CARjCAR < 0; BP < 0), and E(BP  CARjCAR < 0; BP < 0). In this subsample, BP is
directly related to  via the re sale price equation. Therefore, we impose the restriction that
the model match the co-movement between the estimated  and the determinants of the assets
liquidity, z. Hence, we include the moments E(BP  zjCAR < 0; BP < 0).
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Second, and also motivated by the identication arguments above, m includes moments that
the model predicts were not caused by liquidity shocks, where we have BP  CAR > 0. In this
region, the value spread is highly informative of . Hence, we include the rst and second order
conditional moments of BP   CAR: E[BP   CARjBP  CAR > 0], V ar (BP jBP  CAR > 0),
V ar (CARjBP  CAR > 0), V ar (BP   CARjBP  CAR > 0), and E[BP  CARjBP  CAR >
0]. Similarly, we include the moments E [(BP   CAR) xjBP  CAR > 0] to constrain that our
estimates of  match the co-movement between the valuation spread and the determinants of
the owners liquidity, x.
Third,m includes the rst-order unconditional moments E (BP  x), E(CARx), E (BP  z),
and E(CAR  z).6 These moments provide additional information on all parameters, because
they are weighted averages of the conditional moments above (and of moments not included)
where the weights are the corresponding conditional probabilities, which are themselves infor-
mative about ;  and :
IV. Data
Our data set combines Thomson One Bankers Mergers and Acquisitions data, CRSP and
Compustat. We complement these with characteristics of the aggregate economy, which are
obtained from the Board of Governors of the U.S. Federal Reserve. Table I describes in detail
the variables constructed from these sources.
<INSERT TABLE I ABOUT HERE>
A. Sample selection
We consider all U.S. disclosed-value acquisitions of a block of more than 35% but less than
90% of the stock between January 1, 1990, and December 31, 2010 in Thomson One Bankers
M&A. The lower bound on block size is imposed so that the blockholder has e¤ective control
over the rm. Arguably, control can be e¤ectively achieved with less than 35% of the stock (e.g.,
Barclay and Holderness (1991) and Agrawal and Nasser (2012) argue that 5% may be enough).
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We use the conservative value of 35% because smaller blocks are subject to di¤erent economics:
(i) with smaller blocks, a raider may acquire control without buying the existing block (see
Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (2000)), complicating the pricing mechanism with the e¤ect of
alternative buying strategies; (ii) the incentive alignment e¤ect strengthens with block size,
minimizing the chances that a trade for larger controlling blocks is motivated by heterogeneity
in private benets; and (iii) larger blocks are more likely to be subject to liquidity shocks as
they represent a larger fraction of the owners wealth, all else equal. The Internet Appendix
presents results of estimating the model using a lower bound of 10%. This larger sample appears
to have more trades due to private benets, producing weaker estimation results.
We exclude deals such as block trades between parent companies and subsidiaries, spin-o¤s,
equity carve-outs, recapitalizations, repurchases and others that either fail to have a price for
the target before the trade or do not otherwise t the structure of the model of two independent
blockholders trading an existing block. Our sample starts with 1; 751 deals. Of these, only 395
deals involve publicly traded targets. From these 395 deals, we drop 146 deals because the deal
synopses or one of at least two news articles about each deal report either (i) a di¤erent deal type
than in the Thomson One Banker data (e.g., spin-o¤s or parent-subsidiary deals that should
have been eliminated previously), or (ii) changes in the block size simultaneous or subsequent
to the trade (in 51 deals the block is made of newly issued shares, in 22 deals the trade was
shortly followed by an acquisition of the remaining interest and in 14 deals it was followed by
a tender o¤er). Indeed, the latter events are inconsistent with the model, where the block size
remains constant after the trade. We match each deal to the target rms Compustat record
on the last December preceding the trade announcement. The nal sample of 114 deals (45:7%
of 249) excludes deals where the target is not covered by CRSP or Compustat after the trade.
Details of the sample selection are included in Appendix D.
Table II summarizes the main characteristics of the block trades: the mean block size is 59.7%
with a standard deviation of 15.1%, and the average deal value is $193 million with a standard
deviation of $720 million. To measure CAR and BP , we compute each stocks market beta and
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liquidity beta from a regression of daily returns on the contemporaneous value-weighted CRSP
portfolio return and the innovations in the Pástor-Stambaugh (2003) market liquidity index
using all available prices from 252 days to 21 days before the announcement. The estimated
parameters are used to adjust CAR and BP for changes in systematic risk and liquidity risk in
line with the assumption of risk-neutral shareholders in the model.
<INSERT TABLE II ABOUT HERE>
B. Determinants of the owners liquidity
We interpret  as shock to the blockholders preference for, or access to cash, which forces the
sale of the block. We expect this shock to occur in times of tighter aggregate funding liquidity.
Our proxy for funding liquidity is the bond liquidity premium index in Fontaine and Garcia
(2012) (Fontaine-Garcia). Fontaine and Garcia (2012) identify a monthly latent liquidity factor
from the yield spread between US Treasury bills with the same cash ows but di¤erent ages.
They interpret the higher yields on otherwise identical older Treasury bills as a premium on
the liquidity of on-the-run bonds. We hypothesize that their index is positively associated with
: We discuss other measures of liquidity in Section VI.
We include also the growth of U.S. GDP per capita (GDP growth). The inclusion of a busi-
ness cycle variable is meant to capture two opposing e¤ects: during expansions, (i) investors
have stronger balance sheets and are less likely to face liquidity shocks, and, (ii) better alter-
native investment opportunities may generate a preference for cash. We try to separate these
hypotheses by interacting the business cycle variable with variables that describe aggregate
funding costs. We argue that having a better alternative investment opportunity would only
force the blockholder to sell if at the same time the cost of borrowing is high. The proxy for
the cost of funding used is the slope of the yield curve, measured by the di¤erence in interest
rates on the 10-year and the 3-month Treasury bills (Yield curve slope). We expect high GDP
growth to have a negative direct e¤ect on ; but a positive e¤ect via its interaction with the
yield curve slope.
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We also include in the determinants of  the average daily return on the equally-weighted
portfolio of all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks (Market Return) and the standard de-
viation of the returns on the same portfolio (Market Volatility). Gromb and Vayanos (2002)
and Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) show that liquidity providers face tighter funding con-
straints when market returns are low and volatility is high and thereby diminish their role as
liquidity providers (see also Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2002)). We therefore predict 
to decrease with Market Return and to increase with Market Volatility. Because stock returns
may also capture investment opportunities, we also include the interaction between the Yield
curve slope and Market Return.
C. Determinants of the assets liquidity
We think of  as describing the liquidity of controlling blocks. The empirical literature on
the liquidity of productive assets largely follows Williamson (1988) and species liquidation
values as a function of the assets physical redeployability.7 We adopt this idea and specify the
blocks liquidity as a function of its nancial redeployability. Given that measuring the blocks
nancial redeployability requires unavailable data on incumbent and potential blockholders,
we borrow proxies for the assets redeployability. Indeed, we expect the physical capital to
be correlated with the human capital needed to make good use of it (e.g., the more specic
the asset, the more scarce the required human capital). The cost of this choice is the risk of
introducing noise in the estimation. Only more data in the future can help capture these e¤ects
better.
The industrys asset specicity captures the human capital needed to make good use of the
assets. Therefore, we view it as a proxy for the amount of industry-specic knowledge required
by the controlling blockholder, and expect more potential buyers of controlling stakes in rms
that use generic productive assets. We hypothesize that higher specicity causes a steeper
re sale discount of the block. We follow Stromberg (2000) and measure Industry Specicity
with the median proportion of machinery and equipment to total assets of all rms in the
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industry (non-industry specic assets include land, commercial real estate and cash). Shleifer
and Vishny (1992) add that, because assets of distressed rms tend to be best sold within the
same industry, redeployability is a function of the industrys capacity to absorb them. As an
additional measure of the blocks redeployability, we use the ratio of the block value to the
total market capitalization of all rms in the same 2-digit SIC group (Block-to-Industry Size).
Table II shows that, while the trades in our sample are small relative to their industriestotal
equity (mean of 0.008), there is large variation in this measure. Based on this interpretation,
we expect the liquidation parameter, ; to decrease with the relative size of the block. However,
if blockholders have a preference for relatively larger blocks in order to, say, exert control over
industry policies, then  would vary positively with Block-to-Industry Size.
We let the blocks re sale parameter vary with the targets leverage relative to its industrys
median leverage. We dene Target minus Industry Leverage as the di¤erence between the
targets proportion of long-term debt to assets and the median proportion of long-term debt
to assets of all rms in the same 3-digit SIC code. We expect blockholders to price a bigger
discount for rms with more long term debt as they are more constrained in borrowing to fund
any restructuring activities.
We include the total dollar volume of M&A activity involving targets in the same 2-digit SIC
group during the last quarter before the deal. High Industrys M&A Activity could be the result
of an increased supply of industry-specic assets, which would depress the liquidation value of
the block. High Industrys M&A Activity could also reect high liquidity for industry-specic
assets as in Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walkling (2002) and Ortiz-Molina and Phillips (2012)
and, therefore, increase the blocks liquidation value. To control for the time-series variation
in investment opportunities in the same industry, we include the median ratio of the market-
to-book value of assets of all rms in the same 3-digit SIC code. Finally, we control for the
possibility that re sale prices are a¤ected by the target rms return volatility.
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V. Results
We present results for a baseline specication and for an extension of the baseline spec-
ication that tries to distinguish between liquidity shocks due to an increase in investment
opportunities or a shortage of funding.
A. Model t
Panel A of Table III evaluates the quality of the models t to the data. In the baseline
specication (specication (1)), the model estimates the average block premium to be 9.6%,
which is larger than the sample mean of 6.7%. In the extended specication (specication (2)),
the model gets closer, predicting an average block premium of 6.2%. Specication (2) is better
at matching the fraction of discounts, but it underestimates the standard deviation of the block
premium. The model produces a correlation between actual and predicted block premiums of
about 0.11.
The two specications predict similar CAR moments. Under both specications, the model
underpredicts the mean and standard deviation of CAR, but gets close to matching the frac-
tion of negative CAR in the data. Despite underpredicting CAR, the model generates a cor-
relation between actual and predicted CAR of almost 0.4. The model can t BP better than
CARbecause: (i) unlike share prices, block prices are also directly a¤ected by private benets
of control, re sale discounts and the bargaining power parameter; and, (ii) the variation in the
cash ow distribution, which we estimate to be quite high, is smoothed out signicantly in p
by the fact that share prices are forward looking, therefore constraining the maximum possible
predicted CAR. A detailed discussion of point (ii) is provided in the Internet Appendix.
Recall from Section I that 74% of the trades with positive CAR exhibit a block premium
and that 75% of the trades with a negative CAR exhibit a block discount. In the baseline
specication the corresponding numbers are 61% and 55% whereas in the extended specication
the corresponding numbers are 77% and 67%. Note that specication (2) performs well in
capturing these moments despite the fact that they were not targeted by the SMM estimation.
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For both specications, we reject the hypothesis that all of the models parameters are
zero (p-value of 0:00). Further, with 95% condence, we cannot reject the joint hypotheses
that the model is correctly specied and that the moment conditions over-identify the models
parameters. We investigate the model t also by inspecting the models ability to match the
moment conditions in the SMM estimation. Table IV reports a moment-by-moment match for
both specications.
The model does a good job matching the moments that are most informative of  and
: the unconditional mean of BP ; the mean of BP   CAR conditional on BP > CAR > 0;
the correlation of the valuation spread BP   CAR with some of the proposed determinants of
liquidity conditional on BP > CAR > 0; and, many of the correlations of BP and CAR with
some of the proposed determinants of liquidity shocks (the yield curve slope and its interactions
with GDP growth or market returns) and of re sale values (target leverage relative to its
industry median, target industrys asset specicity). The ability to match the correlations of
BP and CAR with determinants of liquidity is consistent with the relatively low standard errors
for the associated coe¢ cients.
The model does poorly in matching the second order moments and specically moments
that are related to CAR. One possible reason for this failure is the risk neutrality assumption
that eliminates all variation in risk premia. Future models should consider risk aversion and
variation in risk premia to better match the moments associated with CAR. Another possibility
for this failure is that that SMM gives these moments smaller optimal weights, as the estimation
procedure trades o¤ the matching error with the precision of the momentsmeasurement.
As an additional test to the t of the model, we count the number of trades that satisfy
the condition that trading following a liquidity shock is ine¢ cient, that is, v (I)+B > v (R).
This condition is veried in each specication for all trades in the sample.
<INSERT TABLE III ABOUT HERE>
<INSERT TABLE IV HERE>
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B. Parameter estimates
Panel B of Table III presents the parameter estimates. We estimate the parameter associated
with market thinness, , to be 0:59 in specication (1) and 0:43 in specication (2). These
estimates are statistically signicant at the 1% level. Their magnitude suggests that a seller is
expected to meet a potential buyer absent a liquidity shock roughly once every two years.
In both specications, the estimated incumbents bargaining power in the absence of a
liquidity shock is close 0.5. These point estimates are statistically signicantly di¤erent from
0, but not from 0.5. We take this result as additional empirical support for our model given
that there is no reason to expect buyers to have a bargaining advantage over sellers in times of
normal liquidity.
At the bottom of panel B of Table III, we present the estimates of the private benets
function parameters. The estimated average private benets per share in the block are 17.6%
in specication (1) and 7.9% in specication (2). Neither is statistically signicant at normal
signicance levels.
B.1. Cross-sectional determinants of owners liquidity
GDP growth has a negative and signicant e¤ect on . In terms of economic signicance,
and in both specications, a one standard deviation increase in GDP growth is associated with a
decrease in  of 0:03. The sign of the point estimate supports the hypothesis that in expansions
agents have stronger balance sheets and are less likely to face liquidity shocks.
The coe¢ cient on Market Return is negative and has the strongest e¤ect on  in terms of
economic signicance: one sample standard deviation increase in Market Return is associated
with a large decrease in  of 0.11 in specication (1) and of 0.31 in specication (2). This
result is in line with that of GDP growth and suggests that periods of high market returns in
the sample are periods of increased liquidity. The e¤ect of Market Volatility is unexpectedly
negative, although not always signicant at the 5% level.
Tighter funding liquidity in the bond market, as measured by the Fontaine-Garcia index, has
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a statistically and economically signicant positive e¤ect on : The cost of funding as proxied
by the Yield curve slope has positive e¤ect on , which is especially strong in specication (2).
Specication (2) adds the interactions between GDP growth and Market Return with the
Yield curve slope. The estimated coe¢ cients of these variables are positive and strongly sta-
tistically and economically signicant. These results support the hypothesis that blockholder
liquidity shocks are more likely to occur with the arrival of better alternative investment op-
portunities in expansions, together with high cost of borrowing.
B.2. Cross-sectional determinants of assets liquidity
The e¤ects of Target minus Industry Leverage and of Industry Specicity on  are negative
as expected, statistically signicant in both specications in Table III, and in further tests
discussed later. In specication (2), a one sample standard deviation increase in Target minus
Industry Leverage leads to a reduction in the re sale parameter of 4 percentage points, and
one sample standard deviation increase in the specicity of the industrys assets is associated
with a decrease in the re sale parameter of 2 percentage points.
While not statistically signicant, the Industrys M&A Activity has a strong positive ef-
fect on re sale prices. The sign of this estimate is consistent with the interpretation that a
large volume of M&A activity within an industry reects enhanced liquidity for acquisitions
(Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walkling (2002)), although its lack of precision suggests the proxy
may be contaminated by supply e¤ects, which have the opposite sign.
Industry Market-to-Book has a positive e¤ect on re sale prices, if not always statistically
signicant, implying that a given controlling block is worth more when there are more growth
options available in the industry. Finally, beyond these controls, we nd insignicant e¤ects of
the Target Volatility, or of the size of the block relative to its industry, Block-to-Industry Size.
C. In-sample distributions of  and 
Table V and Figure 3 show the estimated distribution of  under specication (2). The
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estimated average  is 0.2, with a standard deviation of 0.3. This estimate suggests that on
average a blockholder is hit by a liquidity shock that forces a sale once every ve years.8 The
table also shows that approximately 25% of the trades have an estimated  of at least 24%. The
frequency of deals with extremely large  may appear low relative to the 42% of deals in the data
with negative CAR. This discrepancy is explained by the following reasons. First,  is an ex ante
measure of liquidity shocks computed using ex post data from each deal. A liquidity shock may
have occurred despite the low ex ante probability. Second, and more mechanically, the estimate
of  is not equal to the proportion of deals with negative CAR but is a nonlinear function of
this statistic and also deal dependent. We further discuss in Section V.E the interpretation of
the size of the estimates of  and of  in the context of our model.
<INSERT TABLE V ABOUT HERE>
<INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE>
Table V shows that, conditional on a liquidity shock, the estimated blocks re sale price is
on average 92% of the buyers block valuation, with 25% of the targets with an estimated  of
less than 89%. The implied re sale discounts are similar to estimates for other markets, that
is, to the aircraft liquidation values reported in Pulvino (1998) and to the gains from trading
on price pressure sales reported in Coval and Sta¤ord (2007). Panel (b) of Figure 3 shows the
predicted histogram of .
D. Illiquidity discounts
D.1. Marketability discount
We dene the marketability discount of a controlling block with respect to security benets,
dM ; as
dM ()  1  v (; ; ; :)
v (0; 1; 1; :)
:
The formula makes explicit the dependence of v on , , and . It is easy to show that dM ()
is positive, and that v (0; 1; 1; :) > v (; ; ; :) for any ; provided  > 0 or  < 1. The function
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dM () quanties the value of the shares in the block relative to the counterfactual scenario
where it is possible to trade at any time ( = 1) and voluntarily ( = 0). This measure of the
marketability discount di¤ers from the one in Longsta¤ (1995) because in dM it is presumed
that the blockholder remains in control, whereas in Longsta¤s measure there is no presumption
of control.
Table V shows that the estimated average marketability discount is 13%, reaching a max-
imum of 89%. The predicted marketability discount varies with the predicted . Panel (a) of
Figure 4 plots the marketability discount function for every  2 [0; 1]. We see that, for the rms
in the lower quartile of ; the marketability discount increases quickly, reaching 40% for  just
below 20%. The estimated marketability discount is also large for blocks with intermediate re
sale prices. However, for blocks with the highest re sale parameter estimates, the marketability
discount is under 5% for any . Panel (b) plots the predicted distribution of the marketability
discount.
<INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE>
D.2. Illiquidity-spillover discount
We dene the illiquidity-spillover discount, dIS ; as
dIS ()  1  p (; ; :)
p (0; 1; :)
:
We have that p (0; :) > p (; :) for any  > 0 and that dIS > 0. The illiquidity-spillover discount
quanties the price of dispersed shares that would prevail in the absence of search costs. It is a
spillover e¤ect in that the dispersed shareholders are not hit by a liquidity shock nor experience
market thinness directly but rather through the blockholder. However, p incorporates the
possibility that control may change hands and that the value of assets will change as a result.
Table V shows that the cost of forced block turnover is important to dispersed shareholders:
we estimate an average illiquidity-spillover discount of 2:1% on dispersed shares (maximum close
to 10%). This e¤ect is ve times as large as the average quoted bid-ask spread (Bollen, Smith,
and Whaley (2004)).
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Panel (a) of Figure 5 plots the illiquidity-spillover discount against ; conditional on the
rms cash ow state before the trade. As the gure shows, this discount is higher for rms
with high cash ow because these rms have more to lose if, due to a liquidity shock, the
incumbent blockholder is forced to sell to a less e¢ cient rival. Panel (b) plots the predicted
distribution of the illiquidity-spillover discount.
<INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE>
D.3. Control discount
We dene the control discount from security benets, dC , as
dC ()  1  v (; ; ; :)
p (; ; :)
:
Given that v < p for any  > 0, then dC > 0. The control discount measures the di¤er-
ence in valuations of security benets between the controlling blockholder and the dispersed
shareholders. This estimate of the control discount ignores the private benets a¤orded to the
controlling shareholder. Given that dIS is much smaller than dM , the estimated control discount
shares similar properties with the marketability discount, as displayed in Table V. As with the
marketability discount, Panel (a) of Figure 6 shows that the control discount displays high
sensitivity to the probability of a liquidity shock when the re sale parameter is lowest (solid
line). Panel (b) of Figure 6 shows that the sample distribution of control discount is highly
skewed with many trades displaying negligible discounts.
<INSERT FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE>
The estimates of the control discount on blocks of shares in public corporations can be
applied to block valuations in the case of privately held corporations. Valuing blocks of shares
in privately held corporations is di¢ cult, as illustrated in Mandelbaum et al. v. Commissioner
of Internal Revenue (1995). As the court indicated, these di¢ culties arise from the limited
evidence on the proper size of the discount relative to the value of exchange traded shares. Our
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estimates of the control discount can be applied to a paired sample of comparable publicly traded
rms with controlling blockholders to determine the block value. Using rms with controlling
blockholders guarantees that the pricing by dispersed shareholders already incorporates the
added value of the blockholder and the illiquidity-spillover costs.
E. Interpreting discount estimates
Our modeling of search frictions has potential biases in the estimation of the parameters 
and  and hence potential biases in the measurement of the various discounts. Consider the
following two possible extreme alternatives. First, suppose that  is a pure liquidity shock,
that is, one that does not necessarily force a sale. Then  does not represent a pure re sale
price but rather represents the blockholders reservation value. This reservation value is the
best outcome out of all possible ways of dealing with the liquidity shock, including when the
incumbent keeps the block but borrows against it as collateral; sells to a white knight, such
as a private-equity rm supplying the needed liquidity; sells only a fraction of the block while
retaining control (though this is rare according to Barclay and Holderness, 1989); or, sells at a
re sale price. While these possibilities are out of the model, we note that, since the re sale is
the chosen alternative in our sample, then  is an upper bound to the re sale price.
Second, suppose that  captures a more restrictive event: the event of a liquidity shock and
having failed to deal with it in any other way other than selling. By denition, this more
restrictive type of shock leads to a re sale and  then represents a pure re sale price. In this
case,  is a lower bound on a pure liquidity shock.
Consider now the impact of these two alternative interpretations of  and  on the mar-
ketability discount, dM . Because dM is decreasing in , an upper bound on the re sale price as
implied by the rst scenario leads to a lower bound on dM . As for the second alternative, a lower
bound on  also leads to a lower bound on the marketability discount because dM is increasing
in . In conclusion, while we may not be measuring  and  exactly as pure search costs, the
implications for mismeasurement of dM are consistent and lead to an estimated marketability
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discount that is always a lower bound to the true marketability discount.
The illiquidity-spillover discount, dIS, is invariant to  and increasing in . Hence the esti-
mation also produces a lower bound for the illiquidity-spillover discount. Finally, the control
discount dC is decreasing in , but monotonicity with respect to  cannot be determined ana-
lytically. Numerically, we showed above that dC is increasing in , so that the estimated dC is
also a lower bound to the true control discount.
F. Illiquidity discounts by industry
To illustrate the cross-sectional di¤erences in the illiquidity discounts, Table VI presents the
highest and lowest values of the discounts by 2-digit SIC code group of the target rm. The
analysis excludes the 2-digit SIC groups with fewer than 3 observations.
Firms in the Air Transportation industry (code 45) have the highest average marketability
and control discounts. This result may be surprising given that aircraft would appear to be
assets of very low specicity. However, Pulvino (1998) and Benmelech and Bergman (2008)
provide strong evidence that aircraft re sales do exist, and that their liquidation values can
vary signicantly across airlines. The high discount estimates for this industry, which are the
result of a combination of relatively high estimates of  (0.46) and relatively low estimates of
 (0.81), are largely explained by high values of the high yield curve slope contemporaneous
to these trades, and the fact that the traded rms were highly levered with respect to their
industry.
Firms in Business Services (code 73) and Electronic and Other Electrical Equipment (code
36) rank among the industries with the lowest for marketability discount. Their ranking is
explained by the fact that these industries have relatively high estimates of average , but also
high estimates of average . For Business Services,  is relatively high due to a combination of a
steep yield curve and high values of the Fontaine-Garcia index contemporaneous to the trades,
while  is high due to low target leverage and low asset specicity. In the case of Electronic
and Other Electrical Equipment, the high value of  appears to come from a high volume of
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industry-specic M&A.
Industries 73 and 36 are interesting because, despite having some of the lowest marketability
discounts, they have the fourth and fth highest illiquidity-spillover discounts, respectively.
The reason for their high illiquidity-spillover discount is the high variance of cash ows in the
industry: they rank second and fth in terms of cash ow volatility, respectively. The high
cash ow volatility yields a high option value associated with nding a better blockholder to
run the rm, but market thinness reduces the contribution of this option to share prices. For
the same reason, the rms in Engineering, Accounting and Management Services (code 87) and
Building Contractors (code 15) rank rst and second in terms of illiquidity-spillover discounts.
These industries have the highest and third highest estimated cash ow volatilities, respectively,
among the industries in the sample.
<INSERT TABLE VI ABOUT HERE>
VI. Additional Tests
This section considers several extensions to our model. Unless noted, the results are tabu-
lated in an Internet Appendix.
A. Trading due to private benets
In our model, blocks are traded due to liquidity shocks or e¢ ciency gains. In practice,
block trades may also occur due to di¤erences in private benets of control, as in Burkart,
Gromb, and Panunzi (2000) or Dyck and Zingales (2004). Therefore, one important question
is whether our identication of the modelled motives for trading is a¤ected by the omission of
the private benets motive. For example, trades in our sample may have occurred because the
new blockholders enjoyed signicantly more private benets than the incumbent while being
detrimental to dispersed shareholders, that is, R < I . Given that those trades would also
result in CAR < 0; we could potentially identify them incorrectly as liquidity shock-driven,
biasing the estimate of  upwards.
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The crucial feature of our identication strategy that distinguishes the e¤ects of liquidity
from the private benets motive is that we use the joint distribution of BP and CAR. To see
how the distinction is made, consider the possible outcomes of liquidity and private benets
trades. The former causes either that (L1) the block is bought by a white knight who can
also run the rm more e¢ ciently, and CAR > 0; or that (L2) the block buyer is less e¢ cient
at running the rm, and CAR < 0: The latter will have seemingly similar e¤ects: either (B1)
the buyer, who values private benets more than the seller, is also able to run the rm more
e¢ ciently, and CAR > 0; or (B2) the buyer is less e¢ cient at managing the rm and CAR < 0.
Clearly, from CAR data alone the two types of trades are observationally equivalent and we
cannot distinguish neither (L1) from (B1) nor (L2) from (B2).
But in addition to CAR; BP is informative because it captures the fact that liquidity shocks
are a bad event for the block holder (because the block holder is forced to sell, likely resulting
in BP < 0), whereas private benets trades are good events for the block seller (they can only
create gains from trade and must result in BP > 0). Formally, in our model liquidity trades
exhibit a negative block premium if and only if
CAR <

p
 
R
  v  R =p  I ;
that is, if the trade is su¢ ciently ine¢ cient. Since p
 
R
   v  R > 0 (Proposition 2), then
the upper bound on CAR is positive. Therefore, if a liquidity trade causes CAR < 0, then it
also causes BP < 0. The reason why private benets trades cause BP > 0 is straightforward:
the seller is not forced to sell unless there are gains from trade with the high private benets
bidder. As we show in Appendix E, this intuition holds in a standard negotiated block pricing
framework (Dyck and Zingalesn (2004)) and extends also to a version of our model without
liquidity shocks.
Finally, note too that liquidity trades may exhibit BP > 0 if CAR is larger than

p
 
R
  v  R =p  I :
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Table VII summarizes the discussion above by illustrating the map of the possible types of
trades L1,L2, B1 and B2 into joint outcomes of BP and CAR: The table shows that liquidity
trades and private benets trades are in general not observationally equivalent, mainly because
the latter cannot generate BP < 0: The only case where both motives have similar implications
are where BP > 0 and CAR > 0.
<INSERT TABLE VII ABOUT HERE>
We conduct several tests to guarantee that our estimates are not inuenced by the possibility
of private benets motives. First, we verify that our estimates are largely una¤ected if we
exclude from the sample the deals where CAR < 0 and BP > 0 (i.e., B2 type trades). After
excluding these 12 deals, we nd slightly lower average estimates of  (0.16) and  (0:9) but
almost identical estimates of the marketability and liquidity discounts, while still matching the
main conditional and unconditional moments as well as with the full sample. This robustness is
due to the fact that identication of  does not rely solely on occurrences of CAR  0 but also
on the model-imposed constraints that, conditional on BP > CAR > 0; the spread BP   CAR
is monotone in  and must therefore covary with determinants of funding illiquidity. The risk
of overestimating  would be present only in the unlikely case that buyers with relatively large
private benets valuation were more likely to be drawn in times of low aggregate liquidity.
Second, we reestimate the model by additionally excluding deals with BP > 0 and low but
positive CAR. This procedure is meant to ensure that we eliminate all B1 type trades, as
these would exhibit the lowest CAR among those where BP > 0 and CAR > 0; and all B2
type trades, as these could also exhibit positive but low CAR due to measurement error in
CAR. After excluding the 12 deals with BP > 0 and CAR < 0; we re-estimate the model on
progressively smaller subsamples, removing each time the deals with the ve lowest CAR values
among the surviving deals where BP > 0 and CAR > 0. We nd that the estimates of  do
not change signicantly after dropping the rst 10 deals. This result is remarkable given that
this exclusion already drops deals with CAR up to 8.25%. This result conrms our previous
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ndings and makes a stronger case that the model is able to identify liquidity trades from
private benets trades.9
B. Trading due to asymmetric information
Trading may also occur if I privately learns bad news about the rm. Such a trade could be
disguised as a liquidity-driven sale provided adverse selection is not too severe in the market. We
believe these trades are rare or non-existent in our data because (i) they fall under the Securities
and Exchange Commissions insider trading laws (Rule 10b-5); (ii) unlike other settings where
insider trading exists, in block trades the identities of both the seller and the buyer are known,
which signicantly increases the risk of subsequent litigation due to insider trading; (iii) no
deal in our sample was followed by insider trading litigation; and, (iv) buyers and sellers in this
market are sophisticated investors, including nancial and non-nancial corporations, private
equity rms, and wealthy individuals that are advised by nancial corporations in these deals.
C. Random e¤ects in  and 
Unobservable shocks to the blockholders personal wealth may be the cause of forced sales
(de Jong et al. (2012)). To explore this possibility, we introduce unobservable, deal-specic
e¤ects on the probability of a liquidity shock and on the re sale parameter. We estimate a
specication that keeps i as before but adds a random e¤ect in i, that is,
i =
exp (x0i+i)
1 + exp (x0i+i)
;
where i is drawn from a normal distribution with mean zero and variance 2 . We estimate an
alternative where we add a random e¤ect to i but not to i: For each specication, we estimate
the volatility of the random e¤ect as an additional parameter, by randomly drawing 1000 values
for i for each deal and averaging them at each of the moment conditions specied above. The
models are unable to produce statistically signicant estimates of the volatilities of the random
e¤ects, despite predicting large point estimates. The presence of the random e¤ects, however,
does not signicantly a¤ect the estimates reported in Table III. We conclude that there may
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be important unobservable determinants of illiquidity costs associated with blockholders that
the model is unable to identify, but their exclusion does not a¤ect our estimates.
D. Other aspects of investor heterogeneity
Blockholders may not be as diversied as dispersed shareholders. As in Acharya and Ped-
ersen (2005), blockholders may still use a higher discount rate despite the adjustment of prices
for market and for liquidity factors. To test this possibility, we decrease the discount factor
to 1=1:15 for blocks larger than 65%. This specication produces similar results to those in
Table III, with the main di¤erences being a slight increase in the predicted CAR variation
(estimated standard deviation equal to 0:85%) and a worsening in matching the average BP
(estimated average equal to 8:9%). The ability to generate more CAR variation is due to the
fact that when the future matters less to the investor, the maximum value for CAR approaches
the maximum value of the change in cash ows, which tends to be large. We nd also that
an alternative specication where the blockholders discount factor decreases by 1 percentage
point for every 10 percentage points increase in block size ts the data poorly. Our conclusion
is that blockholders may use di¤erent discount rates than dispersed shareholders, but that the
di¤erence appears to be relatively small for most deals.
E. Other drivers of owners liquidity and assets liquidity
In addition to the Fontaine-Garcia index of funding liquidity, we also considered as candi-
date proxies of illiquidity the spread between the 3-month dollar LIBOR rate and the 3-month
Treasury bill (TED spread), and the Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) stock market liquidity factor.
The TED spread has the expected sign on  but is not statistically signicant, whether we in-
clude it as an additional driver of  in specication (2) or in substitution of the Fontaine-Garcia
index. Our interpretation of these results is that the TED spread is a noisier proxy because
it also captures bank-credit risk. The Pástor-Stambaugh liquidity factor has the expected sign
but an insignicant e¤ect on . Our interpretation is that the illiquidity costs associated with
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over the counter trades of large blocks of shares di¤er from the costs associated with trades
in the more liquid market of dispersed shares. We have also considered the corporate assets
liquidity measure of Schlingemann, Stulz and Walkling (2002) as an additional determinant of
. This variable has an insignicant e¤ect on  as does the total M&A activity amount, a
similar variable which we already include.
Shleifer and Vishny (1992) argue that, in equilibrium, determinants of liquidity shocks may
a¤ect re sale prices and vice-versa. To accommodate this possibility, we add the most impor-
tant industry-specic determinants of  to the specication of  and the most important deter-
minants of  to the specication of . Neither specication passes the test of over-identifying
restrictions. Moreover, in both cases the model severely underpredicts the block premia. Ex-
cept for Target minus Industry Leverage and Yield curve slope, none of the added variables has
a signicant e¤ect on either  or ; respectively. The weakness of these models suggest that
common e¤ects may not be a rst order force in explaining liquidity shocks and re sale prices.
Of course, these tests may be inconclusive if over-specication compromises the identication
of the main parameters. To mitigate this concern, we have estimated the model specifying only
industry and rm-specic variables in  and aggregate liquidity variables in ; nding also a
poor t.
VII. Conclusion
One of the main challenges in estimating the value of control is the illiquidity of the market
for controlling blocks. This paper uses data on controlling block trades and the theoretical
restrictions imposed by a search model to identify and estimate the e¤ect of liquidity shocks on
controlling blockholdersvaluations. Unobservable to the econometrician, the probability that
a block is traded because the blockholder has a sudden preference for liquidity and sells at a re
sale price, can be estimated from the observed block premium and share price reaction to the
trade announcement. We nd that the estimated liquidity shock probabilities are correlated
with measures of aggregate liquidity, whereas the re sale discount on blocks traded following
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liquidity shocks is correlated with industry and target-rm-specic variables.
The estimates of the average marketability discount are large, but they also vary considerably
across deals, time and market conditions. Moreover, liquidity shocks that force the trade
of controlling blocks impose non-negligible costs on the same rms dispersed shareholders.
The paper also shows how to estimate the control discount, that is the private value to the
blockholder with respect to the exchange traded stock price. The determinants discussed here
can be applied to valuation exercises in a straightforward way.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Dene the support of  as X = f0; :::; Ng and let X be the -
algebra containing all the subsets of the countable and bounded X. (X;X ) denes a measurable
space. Let C (X) be the space of bounded, continuous functions f : X ! R with the sup norm. Let
Tv : C (X)! C (X) be an operator dened by
Tv (f) (l)
= l + 
(
(1  )
"
NX
m=1
qlm
 

NX
k=1
qlkmax [s (f) (m; k) B; f (m)] + (1  ) f (m)
!#
+ Lvl
)
;
where
s (f) (m; k) = B +  f (k) + (1   ) f (m) ;
if f (m) < f (k) and 0 otherwise. It is straightforward to show that the operator Tv satises
Blackwells su¢ cient conditions of monotonicity and discounting. Theorem 9.6 in Stokey and Lucas
(1989) shows that Tv is a contraction mapping and therefore has a unique xed point v. Under
the assumption that the transition matrix induced by the conditional probabilities qlm is monotone,
Theorem 9.11 in Stokey and Lucas (1989) can then be used to show that v is a strictly increasing
function in .
Proof of Proposition 2. Let Tp : C (X)! C (X) be the operator dened by
Tp (f) (l) = l + 
(
(1  )
"
NX
m=1
qlm
 

NX
k=1
qlkmax [f (k) ; f (m)] + (1  ) f (m)
!#
+ Lpl
)
:
The rst part of the proof follows the proof of Proposition 1. It remains to show that p () > v (). Take
two functions fp; fv 2 C (X) and assume that fp  fv. Then, we show that Tp (fp) () > Tv (fv) ().
Since fp and fv were arbitrary, we have that the xed points must also have the property that
p () > v (). Using fp  fv note that Lp  Lv, with strict inequality if  < 1. Also, fp (k) >
fv (k)+(1  ) fv (m) for any  < 1 and k  m. Therefore, Tp (f) () > Tv (fv) (), for any  > 1.
The same reasoning applies alternatively for  > 0 and  < 1.
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Appendix B. Model solution
Cash ow  lies on a discrete grid f1; :::; Ng and evolves stochastically according to the condi-
tional probability distribution Pr [0 = kj = l] = qlk with qlk > 0 and
PN
k=1 qlk = 1. The transition
matrix is Q =

q|1 ; :::;q
|
N
|
; where | is for the transpose. The l-th row of Q is ql = [ql1; :::; qlN ] and
adds to one.
Dene vk  v (k) and ~vlk  ~vl (k). We may now rewrite (5) as
~vlk = vk +  
X
m>k
qlm (vm   vk) :
Dene Ik as a diagonal matrix with ones only on the diagonal elements k + 1 through N (e.g., IN
is the null matrix). Let 1 be a column vector of ones. Also dene the row vector v = [v1; :::; vN ]; of
size N . We then rewrite the previous expression in vector notation as
~vlk = vk +  qlIk (v
|   1vk) :
Let ~vl be the 1N vector collecting all terms ~vlk. We have
~vl = v +  
  
M0l  M1l

v|
|
= v +  v
 
M0l  M1l
|
;
where
M0l 
2664
qlI1
:::
qlIN
3775 ; M1l  diag
0BB@
2664
qlc1
:::
qlcN
3775
1CCA ;
and cl = [0; :::; 0; 1; :::; 1] | = Il1 with the rst 1 in row l + 1.
Dene the scalar ~vl 
PN
m=1 qlm~vlm = ~vlq
|
l . Integrating ~vl over possible future states by post-
multiplying ~vl by q
|
l gives:
~vl = vq
|
l +  v
 
M0l  M1l
|
q|l :
The vector ~v, composed of the elements ~vl, can be written as
~v = vQ| +  vM2; (A1)
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where
M2(NN) =
h  
M01  M11
|
q|1 ; :::;
 
M0N  M1N
|
q|N
i
:
Denote the column vector  = [1; :::; N ]
| and rewrite (2) as
vl = l + 
"
(1  ) ~vl + 
NX
k=1
qlkvk
#
;
or in vector notation
v = | +  [(1  ) ~v + vQ|] :
Substituting equation (A1) into this last expression gives the solution for v:
v = |

I  (1  )  Q| +  M2+ Q|	 1 : (A2)
This inverse matrix exists as a consequence of Proposition 1.
For the valuation of dispersed shareholders, dene the row vector p = [p1; :::; pN ], of size N , where
pl  p (l). To solve for ~plk  ~pl (k) in (7), we rst write equation (7) in vector notation:
~plk = pk + qlIk (p  1pk) :
As with ~vl, the vector ~pl of size (1N) that collects all ~plk can be written as
~pl = p+ p
 
M0l  M1l
|
:
Dene the scalar ~pl 
PN
m=1 qlm~plm = ~plq
|
l . Integrating ~pl over possible future states by post-
multiplying ~pl by q
|
l gives:
~pl = pq
|
l + p
 
M0l  M1l
|
q|l :
The row vector ~p, composed of the elements ~pl, can be written as
~p = pQ| + pM2:
Now, write equation (6),
pl = l + 
"
(1  ) ~pl + 
NX
k=1
qlkpk
#
;
41
or in vector notation:
p = | +  [(1  ) ~p+ pQ|] :
Substituting in for the value of ~p and solving for p yields,
p = |

I   Q| + (1  ) M2	 1 : (A3)
This inverse matrix exists as a consequence of Proposition 2.
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Appendix C. Details of the estimation procedure
This appendix describes the procedure to estimate the model in Section II. We start by estimating
the Markov transition matrix, Q, with conditional probabilities qlm. For each trade we estimate an
AR(1) process of the detrended logarithm of the average yearly cash ows of all rms in the same
3-digit SIC as the target, using at least the last fteen years of data preceding the trade. We feed
the estimated AR(1) process to the Tauchen and Hussey (1991) quadrature method to compute the
industrys discrete cash ow grid, f1; 2; :::; Ng; and the Markov transition matrix, Q; for the same
year as the trade. We set N to 15: We then recover the targets cash ow grid by assuming that,
in each state, the targets cash ow is proportional to the industry cash ow, where the constant of
proportionality is the ratio of the observed target share price to the equal-weighted 3-digit SIC average
share price.
We estimate the parameters,   = f ; ; b0; b1; b2;;g using SMM. That is, b  minimizes
J ( ) = (m (:; ) M)0W (m (:; ) M) ;
wherem (fBPi; CARi;xi; zig; ) is a vector of moments derived from the joint distribution of BP and
CAR simulated by the model; M is the vector of the same moments from actual data; fBPi; CARigi
are the block premium and cumulative abnormal returns data, for each deal, i; fxi; zigi are the data
on the determinants of i and i; and, W is a weighting matrix.
To evaluate J , we proceed iteratively. Let  (n) be the candidate parameter vector at each iteration
n  0, with  (0) being the initial candidate minimizer:
1. Evaluate i = 

x0i
(n)

and i = 
 
z0i
(n)

for each deal i;
2. Evaluate m
 fBPi; CARi;xi; zig; (n) by numerical simulation, following the next steps:
(a) solve for the functions v () and p () from the system of equations (A2) and (A3), for
each i; given  (n);
(b) compute the models CAR for all possible states before and after the trade, lm; and
choose the grid values Ii = l and 
R
i = m that minimize the distance between the actual CAR and
p(m)
p(l)
  1;
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(c) compute the models block premium using8>>>>><>>>>>:
iv
 
Ri

=p
 
Ii
  1; if CARi < 0;
s
 
Ii ; 
R
i

=p
 
Ii
  1; if BPi  CARi  0;
qliq 
 
iv
 
Ri

=p
 
Ii
  1+
(1  qliq)
 
s
 
Ii ; 
R
i

=p
 
Ii
  1 ; if CARi > BPi and CARi > 0;
where qliq is dened in (11).
(d) compute the relevant conditional and unconditional moments of the simulated fdBPi; [CARig
distribution;
(e) Evaluate J   (n). If J is not minimized, proceed with new  (n+1).
We estimate the optimal weight matrix cW in two stages: we run through steps 1 and 2 with W
set to the identity matrix, and then compute cW = 1N m:; b Stage1m:; b Stage10. We obtain
the nal parameter estimates after minimizing (m (:; ) M)0 cW (m (:; ) M).
In our search for the global maximizer, we repeat the maximization from each of 16 possible vectors
of initial conditions for  and . This set is fairly exhaustive, in that each initial condition corresponds
to a unique combination of mean and variance of the the logistic distributions of  and : For example,
one particular initial condition generates a distribution of  with low mean and high variance, and a
distribution of  with high mean and low variance. Hence, we have 24 possible combinations of mean
and variance for the two distributions. The possible values for the mean are -0.5 (low) and 0.5 (high),
and for the variance are 2 (low) and 3 (high), which are chosen so as to get a wide range of implied
skewness and kurtosis. Each initial condition is therefore the GMM estimate of  and  that most
closely matches up to the fourth order moments of the joint distribution of  and : In short, this
procedure guarantees that we start our search for the SMM estimator of  and  from di¤erent points
that exhaust the possibilities of the shape of the joint distribution of  and : For b0, b1, b2;  and  
we search in the range of values [0,1].
We estimate the covariance matrix of the estimator, var
b , with (G0cW 1G) 1, where G is
the gradient matrix of vector m with respect to   1. Finally, we verify that our solution is locally
identied by checking that the Hessian H
b  is nonsingular.
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Appendix D. Data
Our data consists of acquisitions of blocks between 35% and 90% of the common shares of a
company. Our sample selection proceeds in the following manner. From Thomson One Banker Acqui-
sitions, we select from all U.S. disclosed-value acquisitions of 35% up to 90% between January 1, 1990
and December 31, 2010. We use the Type of Acquisitioneld in the Thomson One banker database
to exclude: privatizations, tender o¤ers, exchange o¤ers, spin-o¤s, recapitalizations and repurchases,
equity carve-outs, joint ventures, going private deals, debt restructurings, and bankruptcies. There
are several reasons behind these exclusions. First, the identication approach requires the existence of
a share price for the target before and after the deal (which excludes such deals as equity carve-outs
and going private deals). Second, some of these deals possibly involve the creation of a new block
of shares (such as a tender o¤er, and exchange o¤er, or a joint venture). Third, some of these deals
involve possibly a disappearing block (such as a bankruptcy of the target where the debtholders take
over control).
We use the Consideration Soughteld to exclude deals where the exchange involves instruments
that could lead to predictable future changes in block size. For example, we exclude deals where
payment was made using warrants, convertible bonds, debt-equity swaps, or any form of options. The
reason for these exclusions is that the price reaction in the stock market would be responding to a
changing block size as well.
We use the Target Public Statuseld to exclude deals where the target rm is private. These
target rms have no share price before the deal.
There are 1,751 deals in Thomson One Banker satisfying the rst two criteria above, of which only
395 satisfy the third criterion. From our starting sample of 395 deals, we drop the deals where we
nd additional evidence that deals do not conform with our criteria above (using either the Deal
Synopsiseld from Thomson One Banker or at least two news articles reporting on the deal). We
nd 146 such violations, where the most common ones are trades where the block is made of newly
issued shares (51), or where the acquisition was shortly followed by a pre-announced acquisition for
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the remaining interest (22) or a tender o¤er (14). In this sample of 146 deals, the transfer price is
observable and conrmed by reading the deal synopsis.
We merge the remaining 249 deals to Compustat and CRSP. We impose the additional restrictions
that: (i) the targets traded share price is observable for at least 20 trading days after the announce-
ment, to verify that the share price does not exhibit a trend beyond the window where the cumulative
abnormal returns are estimated; (ii) the targets traded share price is observable for at least 51 trading
days before the announcement, where the 21 days prior are used to compute pre-announcement price
and the previous 30 (or up to 50 if available) are used to estimate the market model. The nal sample
contains 114 deals. We obtain the 13F lings from Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings data
for each target rm in our nal sample and verify that no other block larger than 5% exists. This
guarantees that some oat remains in the stock market, but also that no signicant other blockholder
exists in conformity with the model.
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Appendix E. Private benets
Consider a version of our model where blocks are priced following Nash-bargaining and trades are
due to either higher buyer security benets or higher buyer private benets, but not liquidity shocks.
Let Bi be the private benets of agent i = R; I. The per share block price s equals:
s =
(1   ) BI + p  I+  BR + p  R

; (14)
which equals the price in equation (4) when BI = BR and when there are no liquidity shocks (so
v = p): It also equals the block price in Dyck and Zingales (2004). The block premium, dened
relative to the pre-announcement price p
 
I

(this normalization is di¤erent from Dyck and Zingales,
2004), is
s
p (I)
  1 = (1   )

BI + p
 
I

+  

BR + p
 
R
  p  I
p (I)
=
(1   )BI +  BR
p (I)
+  
p
 
R
  p  I
p (I)
;
or,
BP =
(1   )BI +  BR
p (I)
+  CAR: (15)
The gains from trade condition, which states that the block buyer must value the block more than the
buyer, including private and shared benets, is
BR + p
 
R

> BI + p
 
I

:
Rearranging this condition we obtain a lower bound for CAR; i.e.,
CAR >
BI  BR
p (I)
:
Together with the block premium in equation (15), this condition implies that
BP =
(1   )BI +  BR
p (I)
+  CAR >
(1   )BI +  BR
p (I)
+  
BI  BR
p (I)
, BP > BI
p (I)
> 0: (16)
This result says that the block premium in a model where trades may be driven by private benets
but not by liquidity shocks is always positive.
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Table III: Model t and SMM parameter estimates
This table shows the estimates of the matching probability, , the block sellers bargaining power,  ,
the controlling shareholders private benets of control per share, Bi, and the sensitivities,  and , of
the liquidity shock probability, , and the blocks liquidation value, , to x and z, respectively. For each
deal i, i, i and Bi are given by
i =
exp(x0i + 0)
1 + exp(x0i + 0)
; i =
exp(z0i + 0)
1 + exp(z0i + 0)
;
and Bi = b0 + b1  E(vi) + b2  E(pi) 1  i
i
;
where E(vi) is the expected private value of the block, E(pi) is the expected dispersed shareholders
valuation of the shares and i is the block size. The parameters are estimated using the Simulated
Method of Moments, matching the actual moments, M, of the joint distribution of the percentage
block premium, BP , and the cumulative abnormal returns, CAR, to those simulated by the theoretical
search model, m( ; ; b0; b1; b2;;). The data is for a sample of 114 US negotiated block trades in the
Thomson One Bankers Acquisitions data between 1/1/1990 and 31/12/2010. Blocks are larger than
35% and smaller than 90% of the outstanding stock. Standard errors are shown in parenthesis next to the
coe¢ cient estimates.a The economic signicance of each coe¢ cient is the change in i or i associated
with a one sample standard deviation change in each variable in x and z, respectively.
Panel A: Model t
(1) (2)
BP CAR BP CAR
Actual Predicted Actual Predicted Actual Predicted Actual Predicted
Mean 0:067 0:101 0:096 0:022 0:067 0:062 0:096 0:023
Std. deviation 0:584 0:468 0:319 0:078 0:584 0:269 0:319 0:078
Median 0:035 0:058 0:050 0:016 0:035 0:043 0:050 0:017
Proportion of 0:465 0:412 0:421 0:421 0:465 0:404 0:421 0:412
negatives
corr(Actual; 0:121 0:393 0:111 0:396
Predicted)
Over-identifying Joint signicance Over-identifying Joint signicance
restrictions testb testc restrictions testb testc
2 p value 2 p value 2 p value 2 p value
28.28 0.34 1,587.60 0.00 41.93 0.07 1,953.21 0.00
(continues)
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Table III: continued
Panel B: Parameter estimates
(1) (2)
Coe¢ cient Coe¢ cient
 0:59 (0:17) 0:43 (0:10)
 0:48 (0:15) 0:54 (0:14)
Liquidity shock determinants (x)
Economic Economic
Coe¢ cient signicance Coe¢ cient signicance
GDP growth  36:46 (11:18)  0:03 (0:01)  12:00 (6:02)  0:03 (0:01)
Market Return  28:47 (10:36)  0:11 (0:04)  27:31 (15:31)  0:31 (0:17)
Market Volatility  26:34 (14:21)  0:03 (0:02)  14:30 (6:33)  0:05 (0:02)
Fontaine-Garcia 0:60 (0:19) 0:07 (0:02) 0:96 (0:47) 0:03 (0:02)
Yield curve slope 0:21 (0:12) 0:06 (0:03) 1:44 (0:49) 0:12 (0:04)
 GDP growth 50:68 (10:86) 0:24 (0:05)
 Market Return 5:62 (1:80) 0:13 (0:04)
Constant (0) 2:17 (12:66) 1:37 (2:41)
Liquidation value determinants (z)
Economic Economic
Coe¢ cient signicance Coe¢ cient signicance
Block-to-Industry Size 0:09 (4:31) 0:00 (0:02)  0:17 (0:67) 0:00 (0:00)
Industrys M&A Activity 0:43 (0:29) 0:17 (0:11) 0:51 (0:40) 0:12 (0:09)
Target - Industry Leverage  0:98 (0:35)  0:03 (0:01)  2:40 (0:64)  0:04 (0:01)
Industry Specicity  0:24 (0:04) 0:00 (0:00)  1:83 (0:45)  0:02 (0:01)
Industry Market-to-Book 1:02 (0:29) 0:05 (0:01) 3:85 (2:36) 0:12 (0:07)
Target Volatility 0:87 (0:29) 0:04 (0:01) 1:08 (0:91) 0:03 (0:02)
Constant (0)  0:81 (0:32)  2:53 (1:09)
Private benets of control
Sample mean Sample mean
Coe¢ cient (Std. deviation) Coe¢ cient (Std. deviation)
b0 0:09
 (0:01) 0:176 (0:120) 0:05 (0:03) 0:079 (0:097)
b1 0:14
 (0:04) 0:04 (0:04)
b2 0:10
 (0:04) 0:05 (0:05)
a Estimates followed by ,  and  are statistically di¤erent from zero with 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 signicance levels,
respectively.
b The null hypothesis is that the optimally weighted distance between the actual and simulated moments vector is zero.
c The null hypothesis is that all model parameters are zero.
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Table IV: Actual and simulated moments
This table shows the moments used in the SMM estimation. The moments are simulated from the
theoretical search model using the parameter estimates for specications (1) and (2) in Table III. The
moment condition t-statistic is for the test that the simulated moment equals the actual data moment.
The data used are for a sample of 114 US negotiated block trades in the Thomson One Bankers Ac-
quisitions data between 1/1/1990 and 31/12/2010. Blocks are larger than 35% and smaller than 90% of
the outstanding stock.
Conditional moments
(1) (2)
Actual Std. Error Simulated t-statistic Simulated t-statistic
E[BP   CARjBP > CAR > 0] 0:271 0:110 0:197 0:669 0:132 1:268
E[(BP   CAR) xj
BP > CAR > 0]
GDP growth 0:008 0:003 0:005 0:846  0:005 3:589
Market Return 0:022 0:021 0:006 0:738  0:022 2:076
Market Volatility 0:038 0:018 0:031 0:394 0:008 1:681
Fontaine-Garcia  0:149 0:066  0:094  0:840  0:100  0:753
Yield curve slope  0:503 0:288  0:379  0:427  0:140  1:259
 GDP growth  0:012 0:005  0:010  0:355
 Market Return  0:013 0:045  0:056 0:952
E[BP jCAR < 0; BP < 0]  0:368 0:077  0:143  2:909  0:317  0:660
E[BP  zjCAR < 0; BP < 0]
Block-to-Industry Size  0:004 0:004  0:002  0:574  0:004  0:026
Industrys M&A Activity  1:593 0:401  0:304  3:216  0:217  3:434
Target - Industry Leverage  0:039 0:027  0:067 1:029  0:018  0:776
Industry Specicity  0:115 0:030  0:139 0:794  0:096  0:624
Industry Market-to-Book  0:483 0:112  0:450  0:301  0:338  1:294
Target Volatility  0:148 0:040  0:150 0:060  0:061  2:167
Second order moments
(1) (2)
Actual Std. Error Simulated t-statistic Simulated t-statistic
V ar[BP jBP > CAR > 0] 0:417 0:368 0:213 0:553 0:142 0:745
V ar[CARjBP > CAR > 0] 0:126 0:046 0:005 2:649 0:005 2:654
E[BP  CARjBP > CAR > 0] 0:227 0:070 0:159 0:967 0:147 1:142
V ar[(BP   CAR)jBP > CAR > 0] 0:181 0:343 0:188  0:022 0:140 0:119
V ar[BP jCAR < 0; BP < 0] 0:196 0:050 0:029 3:336 0:102 1:881
V ar[CARjCAR < 0; BP < 0] 0:040 0:012 0:003 3:060 0:003 3:059
E[BP  CARjCAR < 0; BP < 0] 0:080 0:022 0:019 2:756 0:003 3:464
(continues)
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Table IV: continued
Unconditional moments
(1) (2)
Actual Std. Error Simulated t-statistic Simulated t-statistic
E(BP ) 0:067 0:077 0:102  0:461 0:062 0:059
E[BP  z]
Block-to-Industry Size  0:001 0:002 0:001  0:630  0:001 0:523
Industrys M&A Activity 0:183 0:337 0:519  0:997 0:102 0:240
Target - Industry Leverage 0:002 0:028 0:016  0:483 0:015  0:452
Industry Specicity 0:000 0:019 0:016  0:843  0:030 1:612
Industry Market-to-Book 0:094 0:102 0:137  0:427  0:039 1:295
Target Volatility  0:013 0:054 0:051  1:198  0:017 0:074
E[BP  x]
GDP growth 0:001 0:004 0:006  1:153  0:003 0:798
Market Return  0:009 0:015 0:016  1:615  0:009 0:036
Market Volatility 0:013 0:012 0:016  0:239  0:001 1:108
Fontaine-Garcia  0:003 0:061 0:060  1:033  0:075 1:195
Yield curve slope  0:132 0:149 0:139  1:816  0:179 0:315
 GDP growth  0:002 0:006  0:010 1:393
 Market Return  0:026 0:022  0:032 0:251
E(CAR) 0:096 0:029 0:022 2:543 0:023 2:515
E[CAR z]
Block-to-Industry Size 0:000 0:000 0:000  0:655 0:000  0:653
Industrys M&A Activity 0:293 0:118 0:130 1:387 0:132 1:365
Target - Industry Leverage  0:005 0:009 0:000  0:483 0:000  0:473
Industry Specicity 0:023 0:008 0:027  0:644 0:029  0:874
Industry Market-to-Book 0:118 0:037 0:028 2:443 0:029 2:421
Target Volatility 0:034 0:011 0:012 1:961 0:013 1:923
E[CAR x]
GDP growth 0:002 0:001 0:001 1:666 0:001 1:635
Market Return 0:003 0:005 0:001 0:208 0:002 0:190
Market Volatility 0:016 0:005 0:023  1:528 0:024  1:739
Fontaine-Garcia 0:056 0:027 0:017 1:463 0:017 1:451
Yield curve slope 0:205 0:066 0:040 2:490 0:041 2:478
 GDP growth 0:005 0:002 0:001 1:774
 Market Return 0:001 0:013 0:001 0:004
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Table V: In-sample estimates of the costs of illiquidity
This table summarizes the sample distribution of the main variables in the theoretical search model,
predicted using the estimates of the parameters reported specication (2) of Table III. The data used are
for a sample of 114 US negotiated block trades in the Thomson One Bankers Acquisitions data between
1/1/1990 and 31/12/2010. Blocks are larger than 35% and smaller than 90% of the outstanding stock.
Sample Standard First Third
mean deviation Min quartile Median quartile Max
Owners liquidity parameter 0:198 0:297 0:000 0:008 0:045 0:244 0:999
()
Assets liquidity parameter 0:921 0:097 0:587 0:889 0:966 0:995 1:000
()
Marketability discount 0:131 0:222 0:002 0:010 0:024 0:125 0:887
(1  v(;;;:)v(=0;;=1;:) )
Illiquidity spillover discount 0:021 0:015 0:003 0:012 0:017 0:027 0:097
(1  p(;;;:)p(=0;;=1;:) )
Control discount 0:125 0:223 0:001 0:005 0:016 0:110 0:886
(1  v(;;;:)p(;;;:) )
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Table VI: The costs of illiquidity by 2-digit SIC Group
This table summarizes the sample distribution of the di¤erent discounts in the theoretical search model,
by 2-digit SIC Group where the target rm is in, and predicted using the estimates of the parameters
reported in Table III, specication (2). The data used are for a sample of 114 US negotiated block trades
in the Thomson One Bankers Acquisitions data between 1/1/1990 and 31/12/2010. Blocks are larger
than 35% and smaller than 90% of the outstanding stock. Industries with fewer than 3 observations are
excluded from the ranking and computations.
Marketability discount
Major Major
Group Top 5 N Mean SD Group Bottom 5 N Mean SD
45 Air Transportation 3 0:462 0:432 63 Insurance Carriers 3 0:024 0:009
15 Building Contractors 4 0:233 0:323 73 Business Services 5 0:022 0:013
13 Oil And Gas Extrac-
tion
8 0:219 0:265 36 Electronic And Other
Electrical Equipment
(Except Computers)
3 0:017 0:004
20 Food And Kindred
Products
4 0:156 0:255 49 Electric, Gas, And
Sanitary Services
4 0:014 0:011
80 Health Services 5 0:155 0:252 60 Depository Institu-
tions
3 0:009 0:000
Illiquidity-spillover discount
Major Major
Group Top 5 N Mean SD Group Bottom 5 N Mean SD
87 Engineering, Account-
ing and Management
Services
3 0:061 0:031 50 Wholesale Trade-
durable Goods
4 0:012 0:004
15 Building Contractors 4 0:042 0:006 35 Industrial And Com-
mercial Machinery
4 0:010 0:002
45 Air Transportation 3 0:031 0:007 37 Transportation Equip-
ment
4 0:009 0:003
73 Business Services 5 0:030 0:028 20 Food And Kindred
Products
4 0:008 0:002
36 Electronic And Other
Electrical Equipment
(Except Computers)
3 0:028 0:006 49 Electric, Gas, And
Sanitary Services
4 0:007 0:003
Control discount
Major Major
Group Top 5 N Mean SD Group Bottom 5 N Mean SD
45 Air Transportation 3 0:456 0:435 63 Insurance Carriers 3 0:020 0:009
15 Building Contractors 4 0:223 0:327 49 Electric, Gas, And
Sanitary Services
4 0:011 0:011
13 Oil And Gas Extrac-
tion
8 0:212 0:267 73 Business Services 5 0:008 0:006
20 Food And Kindred
Products
4 0:154 0:255 36 Electronic And Other
Electrical Equipment
(Except Computers)
3 0:006 0:004
37 Transportation Equip-
ment
4 0:151 0:290 60 Depository Institu-
tions
3 0:004 0:000
62
Table VII: Pricing outcomes under di¤erent trading motives
This table maps the possible types of block trades into the four expected out-
comes of the joint distribution of the signs of the block premium, BP , and
the cumulative abnormal returns of the trade announcement, CAR. Consid-
ering only trades due to liquidity shocks and trades due to heterogeneity in
private benets we have the following categorization: L1 type trades denote
liquidity-driven block sales to a blockholder that is more e¢ cient at running
the rm and increases its security benets; L2 types refer to liquidity-driven
sales to a less e¢ cient buyer; B1 trades represent block sales in which the
buyer derives more private benets than the seller while increasing security
benets; B2 trades are those where the buyer has higher private benets but
lowers the rms security benets.
BP < 0 BP > 0
CAR > 0 L1 L1 or B1
CAR < 0 L2 B2
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Figure 1: Scatter plot of the cumulative abnormal return around the announcement of the
block trade against the block premium.
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Figure 2: Expected di¤erence between the block premium per share (BP ) and the targets
cumulative abnormal return (CAR), conditional on BP > CAR > 0, as a function of the
blockholders liquidity parameter, , the assets liquidity, , and market thinness, . When
held constant,  is set to 0.05,  is set to 0.90,  is set to 0.50. For the remaining parameters,
the incumbent blockholdersbargaining power,  , is set to 0.5, the average private benets,
B, are set to 8% per share in the block and the discount factor, , is set to 1=1:1. The
Markov transition matrix is generated by discretizing an AR(1) cash ow process with serial
correlation of 0.07, variance of 0.05 and long run mean of 0.02. The averages are computed
over 10,000 simulations for each value of the varying parameter.
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Figure 3: Panel (a) presents the predicted histogram of the probability that a blockholder
gets a liquidity shock, , and panel (b) presents the predicted histogram of the liquidation
value parameter, . The histograms are constructed using the coe¢ cients in Table III,
specication (2).
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Figure 4: Predicted marketability discount of the controlling block from security benets,
1   v(;i;)v(0;1;1) , for every value of  (panel (a)), and predicted histogram of the marketability
discount (panel (b)) evaluated at the predicted probability that the blockholder gets a
liquidity shock, i, the predicted block liquidation parameter, i, and the predicted market
thinness, . The marketability discount function and histogram are constructed using the
coe¢ cients in Table III, specication (2).
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Figure 5: Predicted illiquidity-spillover discount of the dispersed shares, 1  p(;)p(0;1) , for every
value of  (panel (a)), and predicted histogram of the illiquidity spillover discount (panel
(b)) evaluated at the predicted probability that the blockholder gets a liquidity shock, i,
the predicted block liquidation parameter, i, and the predicted market thinness, . The
illiquidity-spillover discount function and histogram are constructed using the coe¢ cients
in Table III, specication (2).
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Figure 6: Predicted control discount of the value of security benets in the block relative
to dispersed shares, 1  v(;i;)p(;i;) , for every value of  (panel (a)), and predicted histogram of
the control discount (panel (b)) evaluated at the predicted probability that the blockholder
gets a liquidity shock, i, the predicted block liquidation parameter, i, and the predicted
market thinness, . The control discount function and histogram are constructed using the
coe¢ cients in Table III, specication (2).
69
Notes
1Contrary to a long-held belief (e.g., Berle and Means (1932)), Holderness (2009) shows, using a
representative sample of U.S. public rms, that 96% of these rms have blockholders and that these
blockholders own in aggregate an average of 39% of the common stock. Using a sample of large US
corporations from 1996-2001, Dlugosz et al. (2006) nd that 75% of all rm-year observations have
blockholders that own at least 10% of the rmsequity. Holderness, Kroszner, and Sheehan (1999)
report that the mean percentage share ownership of a rms o¢ cers and directors in 1995 was 21%.
See Morck (2007) for evidence outside the U.S.
2The Internal Revenue Service estimates that in 2007 the wealth of U.S. investors allocated to
closely held stock (in companies that are not publicly traded) was 62% of the wealth allocated to
publicly traded stock.
3The block re sale discount estimate is similar to those in other markets: Coval and Sta¤ord
(2007) estimate a 10% discount on stocks that experience price pressure due to mutual fund outows;
Pulvino (1998) estimates a 14% re sale discount for aircraft of some airlines; Andersen and Nielsen
(2013) estimate a 12.5% discount on forced sales in the real estate market.
4The spillover e¤ect is economically signicant and equal to ve times the size of the mean equal-
weight quoted bid-ask spread on equities (see Bollen, Smith, and Whaley (2004)).
5The empirical literature has shown a positive association between oat and liquidity of dispersed
shares (e.g., Hein and Shaw (2000); Becker, Cronqvist, and Fahlenbrach (2011); Brockman, Chung,
and Yan (2008); and Dlugosz et al. (2006)).
6Note that the rst condition in the vector of conditions in E (BP  x) and E (BP  z) is the same,
because both x and z have a constant term. The estimation only includes one of these conditions.
The same is true for E(CAR x) and E(CAR z).
7See, for example, Benmelech and Bergmann (2008) and Gavazza (2010).
8For specication (1), the estimated average  is 0.1, with a standard deviation of 0.26. According
to specication (1), on average a blockholder is hit by a liquidity shock that forces a sale once every
ten years.
9The changes in the sample mostly cause changes in the estimates of B;  ; and ; and a loss of
statistical signicance in general. These changes are more pronounced once we exclude 15 or more
deals but, by this stage, the deals excluded have very high CAR and are therefore informative not
only of liquidity shocks but also of all the other model parameters.
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